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Analysis of Grutter v. Bollinger et al.
(Law School Admissions Case, 6th Circuit, May 14, 2002)


by Jonathan Alger,
University of Michigan Assistant General Counsel

Summary

            On May 14, 2002, the federal Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in Grutter v. Bollinger et al. that the University of Michigan Law School's admissions policy is constitutional, reversing an earlier decision by a federal district court judge. The federal court of appeals followed the precedent set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978), holding that the Law School's interest in achieving the educational benefits that come from a diverse student body is compelling, and that its admissions policy is "narrowly tailored" to serve that interest. The court noted that the Law School had drafted its admissions policy to comply with Bakke, and that colleges and universities have been relying on this Supreme Court precedent for more than 20 years.

Majority Opinion

            The court found that each applicant is treated as an individual in the Michigan Law School admissions process, which the court characterized as "virtually indistinguishable" from the Harvard admissions plan approved by the Supreme Court in Bakke. The Law School considers a number of factors in its admissions process, including Law School Admissions Test scores, undergraduate grade-point averages, the quality of undergraduate institutions, recommendations, essays, leadership and work experience, unique talents or interests, and areas and difficulty of undergraduate course selection. As the court noted, the Law School also considers many factors "to help achieve that diversity which has the potential to enrich everyone's education and thus make a law school class stronger than the sum of its parts." Race and ethnicity are among those many factors, and the court emphasized that "the Law School's consideration of race and ethnicity does not operate to insulate any prospective student from competition with any other applicants."

            The court found that the Law School's pursuit of a "critical mass" of students from under-represented groups provides a class with meaningful numbers of minority students "to ensure that all students—minority and majority alike—will be able to enjoy the educational benefits of an academically diverse student body." The court noted that the admissions program is flexible, with no fixed goal or target. It does not use separate tracks for minority and non-minority applicants, and it does not function as a quota system. Furthermore, it sets "appropriate limits" on the competitive consideration of race and ethnicity. The court also found that the Law School had adequately considered race-neutral alternatives, and had ample reason to decide that some consideration of race is necessary to achieve its goal of a diverse student body in all of its facets.

            The court noted that the law does not require the Law School to choose between meaningful racial and ethnic diversity and academic excellence, stating that "[a]n institution of higher education need not abandon its academic mission to achieve absolute racial and ethnic neutrality." The court stated that it cannot ignore the educational judgment of the Law School's faculty and admissions personnel, and recognized that the Law School acted in good faith in developing its admissions program.

Dissent

            A minority of the court dissented, arguing that the Supreme Court's Bakke decision is not controlling law and that diversity is not a compelling interest. The dissent also asserted that the Law School's efforts to achieve a critical mass of minority students are functionally indistinguishable from a numerical quota. While acknowledging that race does matter in American society, the dissent nevertheless suggests that the Law School should exclude race and ethnicity from its diversity considerations. The dissent asserts that the pursuit of race-neutral diversity will still somehow produce the broadest "pluralism of ideas and experiences." The majority of the court explicitly refuted the dissent's arguments, concluding that "[i]n reality, by reducing the range of experiences the Law School can consider—namely, the experience of being an African-American, Hispanic or Native American in a society where race matters—the dissent proposes only a narrow and inferior version of the academic diversity currently sought by the Law School."

Intervenors

            A number of individuals and student groups intervened in the case, arguing that the Law School's consideration of race and ethnicity was necessary to remedy the effects of discrimination and achieve an integrated student body. Having found that the Law School's admissions policy is justified on the basis of achieving a diverse student body, the court did not address the rationale put forth by the intervenors.

May 15, 2002

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